Objective As one of Europe's most densely populated countries with multiple nuclear installations and a prominent petrochemical industry, Belgium is at some reasonable risk for terrorist attacks or accidental chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. We hypothesize that local hospitals are not sufficiently prepared to deal with these incidents.
Introduction
The World Trade Center attack of 9/11 significantly raised the world's awareness for large-scale terrorism threats. This threat became clear in Europe with the Madrid bombings of 2004 and London bombings of 2005. As a result, many fear imminent acts of terror involving chemical, biological, or even nuclear devices. Besides terrorism, the threat of significant chemical or nuclear contamination due to industrial and/or traffic accidents is always looming [1] . Moreover, natural forces can cause unforeseen releases of toxic or nuclear contaminants, as was the case with the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster that occurred after the 9.0 magnitude Tōhoku earthquake and subsequent tsunami. One 'positive' consequence of these disasters is that they highlighted gaps in civil and governmental preparedness.
Belgium, one of Europe's most densely populated countries, is at risk for chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, be it accidental or malicious. Brussels hosts the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters and the European Community. Antwerp is home to an important traditional Jewish community and its port is also home to the world's second largest concentration of petrochemical companies. Belgium has two nuclear power plants, having four reactors each, a nuclear research center with facilities for storing nuclear waste, and a production site for radiochemical and radiopharmaceutical products. In addition, two other nuclear power plants are located just across the border in France and the Netherlands.
A study carried out in the previous decade revealed that Belgian hospitals have a limited level of preparedness for pandemics [2] . Little is known about the current state of hospital preparedness for dealing with the consequences of large-scale disasters. Limited research findings and personal experience lead us to hypothesize that Belgian hospitals are not well prepared for CBRN incidents. Thus, as a starting point, we undertook a survey for assessing the preparedness of Belgian civil hospitals.
Materials and methods
A descriptive cross-sectional study was performed, for which a 'paper and pencil' survey was developed. The survey assessed different aspects of current preparedness for CBRN incidents (Fig. 1 ). It was approved by the local ethics committee.
We mailed the survey during the last quarter of 2007 to all 138 hospitals in Belgium with an emergency department (ED). The data collected were specific hospital information and information on hospital disaster planning, risk perception, availability of decontamination units, personal protective equipment (PPE), antidotes, radiation detection, infectious disease specialist, isolation measures, and staff training. For nonresponders, we sent reminders to the departmental heads of the ED after contacting them by e-mail or telephone.
Data were summarized and analyzed using SPSS for Windows (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA). As the data were 'yes/no' responses, we used the w 2 -test. A P value of less than 0.05 was considered significant.
Results
Of the 138 hospitals invited to participate, 100 returned a completed survey; thus, the response rate was 72%. Seven of the responding hospitals were university teaching hospitals.
Hospital disaster planning
Of the 100 hospitals, 71% scored themselves as being at risk for CBRN incidents, likely because 68% were located near a Seveso installation, 30% were near a nuclear installation, and 29% were near another institution estimated to be a potential risk for CBRN incidents. The hospitals had limited contact with others concerning estimated risks: 14% had previously contacted authorities and 19% had contacted other hospitals or safety or security providers such as fire brigades or police departments.
In 97% of the hospitals, ED staff contributed to some extent to hospital disaster planning. Although 71% of the surveyed hospitals rated themselves at risk for CBRN incidents, only 53% had incorporated a CBRN scenario into their hospital disaster plan. Eighty-two percent of the hospitals indicated that they could mobilize extra personnel in case of emergency incidents, and 50% of them had access to personnel specifically trained to handle CBRN incidents. Moreover, 70% of the hospitals stated they could increase their admission capacity to accommodate any influx of patients affected by CBRN disasters. Sixty-nine percent could mobilize extra supplies, if necessary.
Decontamination and personal protective equipment
Forty-two percent of the EDs had decontamination facilities, with a median capacity of one supine or one walking patient. Only a quarter of these had their decontamination facilities located outside or at the entrance of the ED. Eighty-one percent of the decontamination facilities were permanent. Of the EDs with decontamination facilities, 16% had security personnel to control the decontamination process, if necessary, and 50% had separate water and waste collection systems. Four percent had external support/funding for these facilities.
All hospitals had basic protective equipment (gown, gloves, goggles, and N95 respirators) commonly used in influenza pandemics. Only 5% of the hospitals had access to a higher class of PPE such as chemical-resistant suits and air purifying canister respirators. One hospital had full-scale protective equipment, including a self-contained breathing apparatus respirator.
Antidotes
The availability of antidotes is summarized in Table 1 and Fig. 2 .
Nuclear threats
Ten percent of the hospitals were equipped with radiation detection measures at the ED. Four hospitals had simple dosimeters (without direct alarm functions), which were used in the radiology department. Five hospitals had an alpha detector equipped with an alarm function, and one hospital used a combination detector equipped with an alarm function. Although 94% of the hospitals had a nuclear medicine department, only 14% of them had 24/7 access to a nuclear specialist with specific training in regulations concerning external incidents.
Biological threats
Of the 100 hospitals surveyed, 26% had an infectious disease specialist available 24/7 to deal with biological incidents. Isolation facilities for large groups of patients were available in 9% of the hospitals, and for individual cases, in 36% of the hospitals. Forty-seven percent of the hospitals had vaccination programs in place, although these were limited to seasonal influenza vaccines.
University hospitals scored significantly better when it came to access to external companies or facilities with known potential threats, mobilization of specialized personnel specifically trained to deal with CBRN incidents, decontamination facilities including security personnel, availability of antidotes (hydroxycobolamine and pralidoxime) for certain poisons, availability of nuclear and infectious disease specialists, and availability of isolation facilities. Hospitals in the French-speaking part of Belgium were significantly better stocked with hydroxycobolamine.
Discussion
It is not surprising that there are serious gaps in the CBRN preparedness of Belgian hospitals. Comparable studies have revealed limited preparedness in the UK [3] [4] [5] , Poland [6] , Canada [7] , China [8] , and even the USA [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Only Israel seems to be well prepared for these threats [15] .
Hospital disaster planning
With respect to patient surge capacity, the results were acceptable: 80% of the hospitals surveyed could mobilize extra personnel, 70% had access to extra supplies and could increase their bed capacity in the event of emergencies and disasters. Hospital disaster plans are obligatory by law, and we are fortunate that there is a high input from EDs. When it comes to CBRN incidents, however, Belgian hospitals have a primary deficiency: only half of the hospitals surveyed incorporated CBRN disaster scenarios into their disaster plans, even though more than 70% of them are likely to be at risk for CBRN incidents. Only 33% made prearranged contacts with facilities estimated to be at risk for CBRN incidents. Thus, there is a huge loss of potentially useful information for about 70% of the hospitals that do not have these arrangements in place. The cost of establishing a relationship with companies and facilities at risk for industrial accidents or other disasters is minimal. Doing so creates mutual trust between both parties and is valuable in case incidents do occur.
Decontamination and personal protective equipment
The next bottleneck in achieving sufficient preparedness is decontamination. To prevent secondary exposure of ED personnel or infrastructure to toxic materials, as painfully illustrated in the Tokyo sarin attack [16, 17] , all contaminated patients should be decontaminated before entering the ED, or at least at the entrance of the ED. Apart from protecting caregivers and the infrastructure, decontaminating people before they are admitted to the ED also has the therapeutic benefit of limiting exposure to toxic substances [18, 19] . Many hospital managers trust that victims have already undergone on-scene EMS decontamination before being transported to designated hospitals. In the real world, however, many arrive at hospitals by different means, often bypassing the EMS system altogether [17, [20] [21] [22] . Some hospitals mistakenly believe that civil protection services position their decontamination trucks at the entrance of EDs, not realizing that decontamination trucks are deployed at the disaster site itself.
Only 11% of Belgian hospitals in our survey report being capable of decontaminating patients before entering the ED; 31% must transport the contaminated patient through the ED to a shower or bathroom, further jeopardizing normal ED functioning. Moreover, the capacity of existing installations is very limited and unsuitable for multicasualty incidents. It is important to note for planning purposes that 58% of all Belgian hospitals have no decontamination facilities at all. Triage and decontamination site personnel should have sufficient PPE when coming in contact with contaminated patients. PPE consisting of a splash-protective, chemicalresistant suit with a full-face shield and filter purifier respirator mask is the minimum equipment recommended for these situations [4, 20, 23, 24] . Only 6% of all Belgian hospitals adhere to these requirements, hence limiting practical decontamination possibilities to these few hospitals. Fortunately, all of these centers have trained personnel to use these PPEs.
Antidotes
With respect to antidote stocks, the survey revealed a reasonable overall availability of high doses of atropine in the hospitals surveyed, not surprisingly, as these are provided by the government. Hospitals also had adequate inventories of standard antidotes such as naloxone, flumazenil, and N-acetylcysteine, but more unusual antidotes such as hydroxycobolamine, thiosulphate, and oximes were clearly less frequently in stock. High costs to maintain stocks of these drugs and low-risk assessment for their use are probably the major reasons why most hospitals did not stock these drugs.
Nuclear threats
Although 30% of the hospitals surveyed are located near nuclear installations, only 6% of them have access to a radiation detector with an alarm function to identify patients potentially contaminated by radiation. All other hospitals should keep in mind that a so-called 'dirty bomb' can also confront them with this category of risk. Assistance from the nuclear medicine department in these cases is limited, and not one of the seven hospitals has an organized protocol for these risks.
Biological threats
The survey showed that there is a higher availability of infectious disease specialists compared with radiation specialists in the event of biological incidents. Indeed, one of every four hospitals had access to infectiologists, but isolation facilities were limited.
Final thoughts on chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear preparedness
The major thrust of the data from our survey is summarized in the graphs shown in Figs 2 and 3.
Comparing our results with those reported in the available European literature is rather frustrating, because studies of similar evaluations are rather scarce. The majority of the European literature on this subject comes from the UK. However, a study conducted in Poland showed that Belgian hospitals in the present study scored better than 12 important urban agglomeration hospitals in Poland, which lacked chemical plans, decontamination facilities, and PPEs [6] .
An evaluation of UK hospitals' preparedness for biological incidents revealed that 24% were equipped with isolation facilities [3] . Belgium scored better with 36% of hospitals having isolation facilities. In 1999, the chemical preparedness of 308 EDs in six health regions of England was evaluated [4] : 71% were found to have a disaster plan for chemical incidents (vs. 53% in the present study), 10% had a safe and effective decontamination installation (11% in our study), and 12% had appropriate PPEs (6% in our study). After the London bombings of 2005, the English government passed legislation mandating that hospitals bear the statutory responsibility of preparing for chemical incidents. Hospital preparedness was subsequently assessed in 18 hospitals across North West England [5] . The results of the hospitals' preparedness had improved since the last century but were still not optimal: 88% of the hospitals had a chemical disaster plan, but only 38% of them could locate it in a reasonable time frame. All had decontamination facilities, but only 61% were adequately equipped. An organized European survey to assess the current situation seems warranted.
It is clear that our hospitals and EDs are not at all ready for CBRN incidents, even for events resulting in a limited number of casualties. A major gap in the system is decontaminating patients in a manner that is safe for all involved -patients, hospitals, and staff. Financial reasons seem to be the major reason for such gaps. It costs a lot of money to install adequate decontamination facilities, to maintain up-to-date antidote stocks, to buy sufficient kinds and numbers of PPEs and radiation-detection probes, and to educate and train personnel to use these items. Hospital managers give a low priority to potential CBNR risks, especially in times of insufficient financing. Governmental support is unlikely as budgets are being cut continuously. European directives could be a start toward uniform preparedness, as budgets are available.
A limitation of our study is that it was based on selfreported data. Some questions, especially those on antidotes, were difficult to answer and were at risk of a reporting bias. However, we believe that these limitations do not negate our findings and they likely do not mislead one about the problem of unpreparedness.
Conclusion
We observed that despite a high-risk perception of threats, there are serious gaps in the preparedness of Belgian hospitals for CBRN incidents. We fear that in times of a financial crisis the improvements will remain modest. Major data on preparedness expressed in terms of percentage of hospitals possessing the indicated aspect of preparedness.
